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Abstract 
 
This study explores the differences that exist between sales and EPS forecast errors 
in a corporate governance’s perspective. We hypothesize that analysts have a harder 
time to forecast sales than EPS because firms have a greater ability to control EPS than 
sales figures. We also hypothesize the difference in absolute forecast error of sales and 
EPS is larger in weak governance firms, as these firms may tend more often to 
manipulate their earnings. We employ four variables as proxies of corporate 
governance: the number of analysts, market capitalization, institutional ownership 
percentage and years since IPO. We find that the better the corporate governance, the 
more accurate are analysts’ sales and EPS forecasts. Consistent with the idea that sales 
are much harder to manipulate, we find that firm with better governance has a smaller 
difference between the two measures of error. Overall, these results are new and may 
have important implications for better understanding the governance environment of 
firms.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Before the earnings announcement call on May 17th, 2017, IBM was expected to 
report earnings of $2.35 per share and a revenue of $18.394 billion in the second quarter 
according to analysts polled by Reuters. On May 17th, 2017, IBM posted quarterly 
revenue of $18.155 billion and quarterly earnings of $2.38 per share with -1.30% 
surprise in revenue estimation and 1.28% surprise in earnings estimation. 
TherapeuticsMD (Ticker: TXMD), another company on the Nasdaq global select 
market, posted actual sales of $3.98 million comparing to estimated sales of $5.23 
million, providing a negative surprise of -23.81% even though the earnings numbers 
were only -1.52%. 
These two examples are proper illustrations of the topic discussed and explored in 
this research and study: The differences between sales and EPS forecast of a company 
sometimes seems too odd, and lead one to question whether these may be related to 
corporate governance. Why do some companies have huge difference of surprise 
between EPS and Sales, and can it be that this difference relates to the company’s 
corporate governance? The novelty of our idea is that it seems that it should be much 
harder to manipulate sales figures than it is to manipulate earnings figures. In general, 
if the firms miss sales by 1% compared to the Sales consensus, one would think that it 
should also miss EPS by 1% compared to the EPS consensus. After all, analysts use the 
same model to predict both. However, the fact that EPS surprise is much smaller 
suggests that firms may be manipulating earnings using all kinds of accounting tricks, 
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to soften the blow to investors. Our main hypothesis is, therefore that firms with better 
governance are probably less prone to do manipulation tricks, rather they will try to 
update the market continuously on their performance in order not to engage in any 
deception.   
These research questions are initiated by information content in the literature 
review. Livnat’s (2004) study extended the earnings study to further research on the 
importance of sales and expenses. Burgstahler (2006) suggested the possibilities behind 
the management of earnings. Kama’s (2009) study suggested revenues and earnings as 
key value drivers in various contexts. Kama (2009) found that “current earnings are a 
weak indicator of future earnings and the role of earnings is relatively less important.” 
Cormier (2014) found a connection between corporate governance and earnings 
forecast in IPO prospectus and Bonetti (2016) found that firm-level governance had an 
impact on financial reporting quality as well.   
Based on previous studies and especially Kama’s (2009) study, our study further 
focuses on the linear relationship between surprise of sales (EPS) and corporate 
governance factors as mentioned: number of analysts, market capitalization, percentage 
of institutional ownership and different years since IPO. Our first goal is to find out 
whether these factors are related to company’s surprise of sales and EPS and how much 
significance they have. Our second goal is to learn from the differences between 
absolute surprise of sales and EPS to see if firm governance can explain the forecast 
errors.  
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In investigating the relationship between these factors and sales and EPS surprise, 
we follow the methodology of using linear regression. The sample includes 11,062 
observations for 1,564 companies from 2000 to 2016. In the sample, all companies are 
sorted and ranked into five groups for each variable including their average number of 
analyst, market value, percentage of institutional ownership and years since IPO. Sales 
surprise is calculated as the difference between actual sales and the estimated sales over 
the actual sales. EPS surprise is calculated as the difference between actual and 
estimated value divided by the share price. In the regression analysis, a joint and 
separate examination of their relevance with sales and EPS surprise is performed. The 
result shows that sales forecast is much less accurate than earnings forecasts, which is 
consistent with the idea that sales are harder to predict than EPS. We also find that 
smaller firms, firms with a lower number of analysts, firms with lower institutional 
ownership, and young firms have less accurate forecast (both sales and EPS forecasts), 
which is consistent with these firms being associated with more uncertainty, but also 
with them being lower transparency and governance.  
We also analyze the difference of sales and EPS surprise to see if the variation of 
these difference shows a sign of relevance to corporate governance. A t-test of 
difference on the difference (sales and EPS forecast errors) within all category groups 
is tested. We find that firms with less number of analysts, less market capitalization, 
less institutional ownership percentage or relatively new to the public market are 
associated with larger difference between sales and EPS forecast accuracy, which is 
consistent with these firms’ higher tendency to manipulate EPS. 
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Overall, this study has important implications for analysts’ report readers and 
investors. It highlights the factors that have a significant impact on the accuracy of sales 
and EPS surprise. It further suggests that small firms with weaker governance are more 
likely to have earnings management such that there is a bigger difference of surprise 
meaningless accuracy on estimation.  
The study proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we will review the literature and 
express our motivation. In Section 3, we have our hypotheses and testing results. In 
Section 4, we have our conclusions and plans for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There are numerous researches and studies on earnings since Ball and Brown (1968) 
first concluded that “we do not find it disconcerting that the market has turned to other 
sources which can be acted upon more promptly than annual net income.” Researchers 
started extending Ball and Brown (1968)’s conclusion. Fried and Givoly (1982) 
indicated that “The use of analyst forecasts should increase the extent to which a given 
earnings-type disclosure is correctly classified as good news or bad news. Our study 
extends the idea on analyst forecast and tries to measure the accuracy of forecasts and 
find related factors that can explain the forecast errors. Waymire (1984) found that 
“management forecasts are associated with the information about the firm’s earnings 
prospects as reflected in the deviation between management forecast and expected 
earnings.” The relationship between analyst forecasts and management forecasts are 
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important indicators for firm’s future earnings and abnormal stock returns associated 
with the company. Livnat (2004) found that “the post-earnings-announcement-drift is 
stronger when the revenue surprise is in the same direction as the earnings surprise.” 
Kama (2009) extended Livnat (2004)’s study on further investigating the information 
content of earnings and revenues such as the magnitude of earnings management and a 
sign of earnings, etc. Burgstahler (2006) provided empirical evidence of both upward 
managements of reported earnings and downward management of analysts’ forecast to 
achieve zero and small positive earnings surprises. Jiang (2008) found that “firms with 
weak corporate governance are more likely to manage earnings in order to meet or beat 
analyst forecasts.” Cormier (2014) found that firms with better corporate governance 
are less likely to include voluntary earnings forecast in their IPO prospectus.  
In this study, we are inspired by the discussion of earnings announcement and 
surprise from many kinds of literature. Based on Kama (2009), We extend Kama’s 
expectation on the lower explanatory power of earnings with high earnings 
management. We intend to focus on which kind of companies are more likely to have 
earnings management and forecast errors. We also learn from Jiang (2008) and Cormier 
(2014) that corporate governance may be the one that can explain.  
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3. Hypothesis and Testing 
 
After the preliminary discoveries on how a company’s governance, information 
disclosure, and transparency could impact the level of deviation (surprise) of the sales 
and EPS, a couple of hypotheses and tests will be carried out in this paper to see if the 
actual result and trend are in line with our expectations.  
 
3.1 Hypothesis 1: A company’s sales are usually in association with a more notable 
surprise than its EPS 
 
Generally speaking, a publicly listed company would prefer a stable share price 
over a volatile one. A big shock in sales or earnings will cause drastic changes in a 
company’s share price. Therefore, companies would try their best not to have their 
actual sales and earnings deviated too far from analysts’ forecast. The efforts made by 
firms may be related to its operations. For example, cost reduction will help a company 
increase its profit margin. However, it can also be the accounting maneuvers a firm use 
to artificially modify its financial results. Modern accounting standard offers business 
leeways on treatments of some transactions and activities. While the flexible accounting 
rule provides firms with discretions, some businesses may play gimmicks on their 
financial statements to present false results. Among all of the accounts, the net profit 
on the income statement is the one that often gets manipulated because there are 
different ways to allocate and record costs and expenses. For example, a company can 
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adopt straight line or acceleration methods to depreciate the value of its fixed assets, 
but the latter approach can noticeably reduce the net earnings of the business. Because 
there are so many judgments calls can be made when calculating net profit, it is 
believable that EPS is easier to be manipulated. Sales, on the other hand, is relatively 
harder to modify because it is single line number that depends on the company selling 
its product and services, which is not subject to much manipulation. Therefore, if our 
logic is right, we should see a smaller surprise in actual EPS than Sales on average 
(regardless of the surprise direction). 
 
Data and Variables 
 
We downloaded the dataset to test hypothesis 1 from I/B/E/S WRDS database for 
the time between Nov 1991 and July 2017. The original dataset contains quarterly 
actual and consensus forecast sales and EPS data for all public listed companies in the 
United States. Some unmeaningful data has been dropped to reflect the most precise 
and meaningful results. 
To measure how accurate are the sales and EPS forecasts, we need to define several 
variables. The first one is the absolute difference between the consensus sales forecast 
and the actual sales (in percentage). In this paper, we will name this variable Absolute 
Surprise of Sales and label it ASur_Sales in our testing.  
 
 
 12 
The calculation of ASur_Sales is 
 
ASur_Sales =    
| 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 −𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 |
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
 
 
where the consensus forecast of sales is the latest forecast but prior to the actual 
earnings announcement date for that particular period. 
Similarly, the second variable we need to use in our testing is the absolute 
percentage difference between the consensus EPS forecast and the actual EPS. We 
name this variable Absolute Surprise of EPS and label it ASur_EPS testing purpose. 
 
The calculation of ASur_EPS is 
 
ASur_EPS =    
| 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 −𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑆 |
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
 
Note that we use share price instead of the actual EPS to ‘normalize’ the EPS 
surprise and prevent extreme results. The share price is the price at the end of the 
earning announcement period.  
 
Test Result 
 
After sifting through the data, we have obtained 11,062 observations in total, 
coming from 1,564 companies. From the summary results in Table 1 (see Appendix), 
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we see that the mean of ASur_Sales value is 0.07105 among the 11,062 observations, 
whereas the mean of ASur_EPS is much smaller, only 0.0092. To prevent the outlier 
effect, we also check the standard deviation and value of both ASur_Sales and 
ASur_EPS at 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th percentile. The standard deviation is 0.14541 and 
0.04634 for ASur_Sales and ASur_EPS, respectively, which means the actual sales are 
deviated much more from analysts’ expectation than EPS, ignoring the direction. The 
percentile figures also confirmed our thought above for the reason that ASur_Sales are 
consistently bigger than ASur_EPS on all level. Thus, the result suggests that on 
average, the sales in a company are associated with a bigger surprise than earnings. 
Taking the accounting rules and our logic in the hypothesis into consideration, we have 
valid reasons to suspect that firms are doing more manipulations on their profits than 
their sales if no other factors can explain such a huge difference. 
 
3.2 Hypothesis 2: The better the corporate governance, the less uncertainty of its 
sales and earnings, the less surprise of sales and EPS 
 
We employ several variables as proxies of a company’s corporate governance 
quality, even though they may also be correlated with the uncertainty. The first one is 
the number of analysts that provides sales and EPS forecast for the company. We 
believe companies with the better information disclosure and operation transparency 
tend to have better corporate governance, and they will attract more attention from the 
market and earn more trust from investors. On the one hand, the interest from market 
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and investors will drive more demand for professional research, including the 
company’s sales and EPS forecast. On the other hand, more analysts will want to 
analyze a company that provides easier access to its key activities and financial 
information. Intuitively, the more the number of analysts, the more accurate (less 
uncertainty) the forecast, the less surprise of sales and EPS (regardless of the surprise 
direction).  
Moreover, we think a company’s market capitalization is another proxy to reflect 
its corporate governance quality. We assume bigger companies tend to have sound 
administration mechanism as well as better information disclosure and transparency 
than small firms. Therefore, the forecast made for bigger companies (measured by 
market capitalization) should be more accurate (less uncertainty), and the surprise of 
sales and EPS should be less.  
Thirdly, we believe higher institutional ownership can help a company improve the 
corporate governance as well. Compared to individual investors, institutional investors 
often hold a more significant interest in a company. The influence they have allows 
them to evaluate and supervise the company’s strategies, operations, as well as 
information disclosure and transparency. If the corporate governance quality is 
unfavorable, the institutional shareholders can push the management to improve. Hence, 
we assume that the higher the percentage of institutional ownership, the better corporate 
governance, the less surprise of sales and EPS. 
Lastly, we think the companies’ age could affect corporate governance as well. A 
significant difference between a publicly listed company and a private company is the 
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information disclosure requirement. Logically, the longer the company has existed in 
the market, the more familiar it is with the listing rules and disclosure requirement, and 
better the information transparency. Therefore, by adopting the same logic as the 
examples above, we assume the older the company, the better the corporate governance, 
the more accurate the forecast should be, and the less surprise of sales and EPS 
 
Data and Variables 
 
We downloaded the dataset containing the number analysts (No_Alyst), market 
capitalization (MktCap), institutional ownership (Instown) and companies IPO date for 
all public listed companies in the United States from WRDS database. Number of 
analyst, just as the name implies, reflects how many analysts are giving out their 
forecast on a company’s sales and EPS for a specific period (Quarter forecast in our 
case). Market capitalization is a measure of the size of a publicly listed company. It is 
calculated by taking the share price and multiply the number of shares in the market. In 
our research, we use companies’ market capitalization on the same date when the sales 
and EPS forecasts are made. Also, to prevent extreme values in the result, we take the 
natural log of the original market cap numbers instead of the original ones. Institutional 
ownership is the total percentage of shares owned by institutional investors as opposed 
to individual investors. The last variable is called years since IPO (Yrs_IPO). It is the 
time in years between the sales and EPS forecasts are made and the company’s initial 
public offering date. 
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Test Result 
 
Because we interpret corporate governance quality by using proxies such as 
number of analysts, market capitalization, institutional ownership and years since IPO, 
we decide to perform a multiple linear regression by setting these four variables as the 
independent variables. ASur_Sales and ASur_EPS will be the two dependent variables 
in our test. Table 2 shows us the regression results. According to table 2, we find the 
ASur_Sales coefficients on the independent variables No_Alyst, MktCap, Instown and 
Yrs_IPO are -0.0010509, -0.0000631,        -0.0528096, -0.00255, respectively. 
The coefficient value depicts a negative relationship between these four factors and the 
magnitude of the surprises in sales. However, while this negative correlation for 
No_Alyst, Instown and Yrs_IPO are proven with significant t-score on 99% confidence 
level, MktCap shows a relatively weak result by merely looking at the small number. 
The t-score is insignificant, even on the much looser 90% confidence level. The 
possible explanation for this could be that bigger companies often have more diversified 
products targeting at different markets. Worldwide conglomerates such as GE have 
their business realms widely spread from the home appliance to airplane engines. The 
complication of business undoubtedly will make it harder for analysts to give an 
accurate forecast, resulting in an insignificant negative relationship between market cap 
and surprise of sales. 
Similarly, the ASur_EPS coefficients are -0.0002891, -0.0021219, -0.0069349, 
0.0005308 for the four independent variables. The first three coefficient values, which 
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are significant on the 99% confidence level, proved strong negative correlations 
between the magnitude of the surprise in EPS and No_Alyst, MktCap, and Instown. The 
unexpected result happened with the coefficient on Yrs_IPO, which is also significant 
on the 99% confidence level. The positive coefficient suggests a reverse relationship to 
our expectation — the older the company’s age, the bigger the surprise of EPS. In order 
to discover the reason, we carefully examined our data. We think a possible cause for 
the irregularity is the data during the subprime crisis. Since the crisis spread to almost 
every industry, most of the companies around that time reported substantial negative 
surprise on earnings. Because we only care about the magnitude of the surprise, when 
converted to absolute surprise in EPS, these negative numbers will show as big positive 
numbers under absolute value. This thought can also be articulated graphically with 
Graph 1 (see Appendix), on which we can see a spike for the absolute surprise of EPS 
around 2007 to 2009. Additionally, the subprime crisis happened in 2008, which is not 
far away from now, so the Yrs_IPO data are not small, either. Therefore, the regression 
on two big positive numbers is very likely to present such an unreasonable result.  
 
3.3 Hypothesis 3: The better the corporate governance, the less manipulation in 
EPS. 
 
If our assumption is correct, better corporate governance means sound 
administrative mechanism and risk management, which will result in more conformity 
with accounting rules. In this test, we want to discover whether more analysts, higher 
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market capitalization and institutional ownership and older the company age will reduce 
the earnings manipulation in a company. 
As suggested by hypothesis 1, we already showed that on average, absolute forecast 
errors in sales are bigger than those for earnings, which is consistent with the idea that 
it is harder to manipulate earnings. We assume if no company manipulates its earnings, 
the difference between the absolute surprise in sales and absolute surprise in EPS should 
remain more or less constant. However, if this difference is larger for firms associated 
with weaker governance (based on our four proxies), that would be consistent with the 
idea that the difference between the two forecast errors proxies for earnings 
manipulation. Hence, a testing regarding the consistency of the surprise difference can 
be carried out to discover the true relationship between corporate governance and 
accounting manipulations. 
 
Data and Variables 
 
By using the same dataset compiled in hypothesis 2, we are able to create new 
variables to conduct testings. Firstly, we defined a new variable—the difference 
between the absolute surprise in sales and absolute surprise in EPS. We label this 
variable Diff_ASur. 
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The mathematical calculation of Diff_ASur is: 
 
Diff_ASur = ASur_ Sales – ASur_EPS 
 
To generate a meaningful result, the absolute surprise of sales (ASur_Sales) and 
absolute surprise of EPS (ASur_EPS) must be for the same firm and reporting period 
end. Then we divide the difference into five groups based on the number of analysts 
(No_Alyst)1. The 1st quintile means the fewest analysts and the 5th quintile is the most 
analysts. Similarly, we can also divide the difference into five groups based on size 
(MktCap), institutional ownership (Instown) and age (Yrs_IPO). 
 
Test Result 
 
We conducted three different tests for hypothesis 3. Firstly, we calculated the mean 
of Diff_ASur across all subgroups. In Table 3 (see Appendix), we can find that the mean 
of Diff_ASur in the analyst group are 0.0931304, 0.067077, 0.0590501, 0.0434687, 
0.0396256 for group 1 to 5, respectively. The mean of Diff_ASur is decreasing as the 
number of analyst increase. In size group, the mean of Diff_ASur are 0.0888228, 
0.0740259, 0.0578411, 0.0479915, 0.0403867. Again it shows a decreasing order when 
the company’s size goes up. We can find similar stories for institution groups and age 
                                                   
1 Number of analysts for Sales and EPS forecasts may not be same for a company at the same time. We use 
the average number of analysts in our test instead. 
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groups.  
Secondly, to confirm what we see in the above, we conduct a t-test on the two 
typical groups for each of the proxies – group 1 and group 5 in each of the categories, 
to find out whether the value of ASur_Diff in the two groups are statistically different. 
According to table 3 (see Appendix), the difference of ASur_Diff between group 1 and 
group 5 are 0.0535048, 0.0484361, 0.054059, 0.0397105 for analyst, size, institution 
and age groups, respectively, and t-score for the four categories are well beyond the 
significance value on the 99% confidence level. This test confirmed our previous 
thought and assumption that the better the corporate governance, the smaller the 
difference. 
Thirdly, we performed simple linear regressions on each of the proxies. In table 4 
(see Appendix) we can see that the coefficients show high significance on the 99% 
confidence level, and they are all negative in the four regressions. The result 
demonstrates negative relationships between number of analysts, market capitalization, 
institutional ownership, and years since IPO with Diff_ASur, which again proved our 
assumption in hypothesis 3 – as the governance quality increases, the Diff_Asur value 
is decreasing. In conclusion, we can conclude that in general, the better the corporate 
governance, the less manipulation a firm make on its earnings. 
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4. Conclusion and Future research plan 
 
This study examines the relationship between firm governance (number of analyst, 
market cap, institutional ownership percentage, years since IPO as proxies) and surprise 
of sales (EPS). After using several methods, it shows that each variable is negatively 
correlated to the surprise of sales (EPS), meaning that the each of these variables is 
related to the uncertainty that prevails. However, it is also consistent with the idea that 
larger firms, firms with higher institutional ownership, and more analysts are associated 
with better transparency and governance. The main contribution of this study is its 
further examination of the differences between surprise of sales and EPS. We divide 
our sample into five groups based on the average number of analysts, market cap, 
institutional ownership percentage and years since IPO and we use t-test to analyze the 
trend of differences among each group. We find that the difference between the two 
types of surprises decreases with better governance. The better the governance, the less 
the difference and the less “games” are being played with earnings management. We 
also use a linear regression between the difference of absolute surprise of sales and EPS 
and each of the four variables independently. We find that the result is consistent with 
our t-test result meaning that not only the mean of difference is getting lower with better 
governance group by group but that this difference also prevails in a firm fixed-effect 
regression, suggesting that this difference may be a good proxy for firm governance 
over time.  
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The study has implications for analysts’ report readers and investors because it 
helps better prepare the surprise and foresee the accuracy of surprise. It may also help 
analysts better understand and analyze on corporate governance and earnings 
management.  
However, the study is subject to some limitations. First of all, all surprises we use 
in this study are the absolute value of surprise that is only aiming for measuring the 
accuracy of surprise. Secondly, companies in different sectors may also have an impact 
on surprises. Further research may consider positive surprise and negative surprise 
adding another dimension that is worth studying since manipulation are expected when 
the company underperforms. Those topic are left for future research.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Surprise of sales (Sur_Sales) is the percentage difference between the consensus sales forecast and the actual sales, where consensus sales forecast is defined as 
the IBES consensus forecast on the date closest but before the actual annual announcement date. Surprise of EPS (Sur_EPS) is the actual EPS minus the consensus 
EPS divided by the share price in the month of the earnings announcement, where consensus estimated EPS is defined as the IBES consensus EPS estimation on 
the date closest but before the actual annual announcement date. The absolute surprise of sales (ASur_Sales) and absolute surprise of EPS (ASur_EPS) are 
calculated as same as the regular surprise except that we take absolute value on the numerators. The difference in Surprise (Diff_Sur) is Sur_Sales minus Sur_EPS. 
The difference in absolute surprise (Diff_ASur) is Asur_Sales minus Asur_EPS. Institutional ownership (Instown) is the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors on the day when the consensus estimation is made. Year since IPO (Yrs_IPO) is defined as the time (in years) between the forecast made 
and the firm’s IPO date. We initially have more than a million data in this dataset. We have managed to refine this dataset by dropping the companies or time 
periods that don’t have analysts’ estimations. We also drop the observations whose sales estimation are zero because we do not consider a zero sales estimation 
is reasonable and meaningful.  
 
 
 
Obs No. Firms Mean SD p1 p25 p50 p75
Sur_Sales 11,062 1,564 -0.01153 0.16143 -0.68675 -0.02656 0.00361 0.03442
Sur_EPS 11,062 1,564 -0.00420 0.04706 -0.16115 -0.00057 0.00021 0.00130
Diff_Sur 11,062 1,564 -0.00733 0.15908 -0.62877 -0.02570 0.00369 0.03524
ASur_Sales 11,062 1,564 0.07105 0.14541 0.00035 0.01231 0.03105 0.07101
ASur_EPS 11,062 1,564 0.00920 0.04634 0.00000 0.00029 0.00102 0.00336
Diff_ASur 11,062 1,564 0.06185 0.14140 -0.08533 0.00978 0.02777 0.06525
Instown 11,062 1,564 0.61449 0.26468 0.00337 0.44530 0.65596 0.80822
Yrs_IPO 11,062 1,564 20.84723 17.78977 1.19726 7.79178 15.66575 30.03014
MktCap (In millions) 11,062 1,564 9653.955 34377.910 25.594 284.710 955.793 4176.598
Table 1
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Table 2: Multiple Regressions on number of analysts, market capitalization, institutional ownership and time between forecast and 
IPO 
 
This table provides OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the absolute surprise of sales (ASur_Sales), as well as the absolute surprise of EPS 
(ASur_EPS). The independent variables include the number of analyst providing the forecast (No_Alyst), market capitalization (MktCap), institutional ownership 
in the company’s stock (Instown), and the time difference (in years) between the forecast date and the company’s IPO date (Yrs_IPO). OLS regressions include 
year and firm fixed-effects. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. (t-statistics are provided in parentheses). 
 
 
 
 
Constant 0.1650557*** 0.0195572***
[10.95] [5.20]
No_Alyst -0.0010509** -0.0002891***
[-2.42] [-2.67]
MktCap(log in millions) -0.0000631 -0.0021219***
[-0.03] [-4.00]
Instown -0.0528096*** -0.0069349***
[-6.80] [-3.58]
Yrs_IPO -0.00255*** 0.0005308***
[-6.75] [5.63]
Adjusted R-squared 0.4387 0.6562
Table 2
A-Reg on ASur_Sales A-Reg on ASur_EPS
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Table 3: Means of difference between absolute surprise of sales and absolute surprise of EPS across subgroups categorized by 
analysts, size, institutional and age 
 
The table provides mean value of absolute sales surprise (Mean of ASur_Sales) and absolute EPS surprise (Mean of ASur_EPS), as well as the mean of the 
difference (Mean of Diff_ASur) between these two variables in 5 subgroups based on size (MktCap), institutional ownership (Instown), and age (Yrs_IPO). 
Among all these groups, quintile 1 is the smallest size (fewest number of analysts, smallest institutional ownership percentage, or shortest time difference between 
the estimation and IPO date) quintile, and quintile 5 is the largest size (the largest institutional ownership percentage, or the longest time difference between the 
estimation and IPO date).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3
Analyst Group 1 2 3 4 5
Obs 2,572 2,175 2,085 2,081 2,149 Combined Obs 4,721
Mean of ASur_Sales 0.1160189 0.075523 0.0632914 0.0474442 0.0430757 Combined Mean 0.068775
Mean of ASur_EPS 0.0228885 0.0084461 0.004413 0.0039755 0.0034501 Diff 0.0535048
Mean of Diff_ASur 0.0931304 0.067077 0.0590501 0.0434687 0.0396256 t value 11.2115
t value 22.9557 22.829 21.9934 20.6529 20.6533
Size Group 1 2 3 4 5
Obs 2,220 2,214 2,209 2,214 2,205 Combined Obs 4,425
Mean of ASur_Sales 0.1142434 0.0835613 0.0629494 0.0515582 0.0426741 Combined Mean 0.0646868
Mean of ASur_EPS 0.0254207 0.0095354 0.0051083 0.0035667 0.0022874 Diff 0.0484361
Mean of Diff_ASur 0.0888228 0.0740259 0.0578411 0.0479915 0.0403867 t value 9.9514
t value 19.9858 22.9074 25.2314 21.2425 20.6364
T-Test on difference of
Diff_ASur in Group 1
T-Test on difference of
Diff_ASur in Group 1
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Continued: Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional Group 1 2 3 4 5
Obs 2,220 2,214 2,209 2,214 2,205 Combined Obs 4,425
Mean of ASur_Sales 0.1256357 0.0654114 0.0584863 0.0523464 0.053108 Combined Mean 0.0754117
Mean of ASur_EPS 0.0232861 0.091447 0.0055237 0.0031635 0.0048174 Diff 0.054059
Mean of Diff_ASur 0.1023496 0.0562667 0.0529626 0.0491829 0.0482906 t value 10.1432
t value 20.7428 22.3185 24.1433 22.7491 24.3946
Age Group 1 2 3 4 5
Obs 2,221 2,213 2,209 2,300 2,119 Combined Obs 4,340
Mean of ASur_Sales 0.1027805 0.0756736 0.0700689 0.544886 0.0519489 Combined Mean 0.0674756
Mean of ASur_EPS 0.0159163 0.0092778 0.0101077 0.0058257 0.0047952 Diff 0.0397105
Mean of Diff_ASur 0.0868642 0.0663958 0.0599611 0.0486629 0.0471537 t value 8.412
t value 21.4482 20.7728 20.7407 23.2167 20.408
T-Test on difference of
Diff_ASur in Group 1
T-Test on difference of
Diff_ASur in Group 1
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Table 4: Simple linear regression on absolute surprise difference 
 
This table provides OLS regression results where the dependent variable is the difference between Absolute Surprise of Sales and Absolute Surprise of EPS 
(Diff_ASur). The absolute surprise difference (Diff_ASur) is defined as the difference between the Absolute Surprise of Sales and Absolute Surprise of EPS. The 
independent variables include the average number of analysts (Average No_Alyst, average number of analysts for sales and EPS for the particular firm), market 
capitalization (MktCap, in millions in natural log form), the institutional ownership (Instown) in the company’s stock, and the time difference (Yrs_IPO, in years) 
between the estimation date and the company’s IPO date. OLS regressions include year and firm fixed-effects. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. (t-statistics are provided in parentheses) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4
Constant 0.0829951*** 0.1099482*** 0.0948075*** 0.1344634***
[28.92] [7.96] [19.69] [20.14]
Average No_Alyst -0.0027949***
[-7.90]
MktCap (log in millions) -0.0068165***
[-3.49]
Instown -0.0536384***
[-7.01]
Yrs_IPO -0.0034832***
[-11.01]
Adjusted R-squared 0.4055 0.4024 0.4047 0.4092
A-Reg on Diff_ASur
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Graph 1: Absolute surprise of sales and EPS between the year of 2000 and 2016 
 
This graph shows how absolute surprise of sales (ASur_Sales) and EPS (ASur_EPS) change over time from 2000 to 2016. The calculation of ASur_Sales and 
ASur_EPS is as same as the what we stipulated in the paper and table 1, but with one exception—Instead of showcasing the absolute surprise of sales and EPS 
for individual companies, what we show here is the average ASur_Sales and ASur_EPS for all U.S listed companies. 
 
 
